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Plaintiff NuGenEra, Inc., by its undersigned attorneys, hereby
submits its Reply in Opposition to Defendant Dolly's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Dolly presents himself as a victim of outdated
legislation and patent office guidelines full of loopholes. On the
contrary, the United States Patent Office has promulgated new
guidelines, effective January, 2001, to keep abreast of developments
in science. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092
(Jan. 5, 2001). As to the litany of rights presented by Defendant
Dolly, they are either a product of his imagination or, if substantive,
are not infringed by NuGenEra's U.S. Patent No. F6,635,271 ('271
patent). NuGenEra is a legitimate enterprise engaged in socially
beneficial biomedical research. Defendant Dolly's samples were
collected and handled in accordance with established California law.
II. NUGENERA'S '271 PATENT IS VALID AND MEETS THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS FOR UTILITY AS BOTH USEFUL AND ENABLING
Defendant Dolly argues that the inventions in Claim 1 and
Claim 2 (whole genome and gene combination P1-Pl0) have no
utility defined as "well established" or "specific, substantial, and
credible." As formulated by the United States Supreme Court, a
single credible utility is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 101. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529-36 (1966).
This case remains valid law. We herein present several examples of
therapeutic and diagnostic uses that require the materials claimed in
the patent. The uses are first introduced as "well established" and
following this, are validated as "specific, substantial, and credible."
See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1092.
A. The Isolated P1-PlO Sequences in Claim 2 Exhibit Well-
Established Use
The isolated P1-P10 sequences may be used in gene therapy. As
described in the text of the patent, the P1-P10 sequences "confer a
dominant trait" of partial HIV resistance (Pl.'s Compl., App. B.)1 on
1. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing the
Complaint. Appendix B contains United States Patent Number F6,635,271,
the patent at issue in this case, which is published at 971. To obtain a copy of
the Complaint, see The Program for Law and Technology at California
Institute of Technology & Loyola Law School Web site, at
http://techlaw.lls.edu/atc3/pleadings.html.
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a susceptible cell in vitro and on an experimental animal in vivo.
Simply put, a cell supplemented with the P1-P10 sequences can
better fight an attack and inevitable destruction by the HIV. (See
Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.)2 Gene therapy is a well-
established procedure pioneered nearly two decades ago. See JAMES
D. WATSON ET AL., RECOMBINANT DNA (2d ed. 1992).
In addition, the isolated P1-P10 sequences can be used as a
diagnostic tool. Based on the test results quoted in the Detailed
Description of the Invention, the P1-P10 genes play a role in HIV
resistance observed in Dolly cells. Therefore, the presence of similar
sequence variations in other people is predictive of their likelihood of
infection or a long-term prognosis with respect to the development of
AIDS. The entire isolated sequence in Claim 2 may be used as a
probe on a patient's sample. Such DNA-DNA comparison or
"hybridization" is a well-established technique. See WATSON, supra,
at 99-133. Alternatively, the P1-P10 sequences can be used to
design primers so that the patient's sample may be tested by PCR,
another well-known technique. See id. at 539-66. It has become
common knowledge that gene variations are being used in advising
patients on their susceptibility to diseases. The precise predictive
value of the variations in the P1-P10 sequences (as compared to, for
example, variations in the "breast cancer" (BRCAl) gene sequences)
is not at issue here. What is at issue is the existence of a very well-
established method of using such sequences for predictions.
B. The Entire Isolated Dolly Genome in Claim 1 Exhibits Well-
Established Use
The isolated Dolly Genome likewise can be used in various
diagnostic procedures. The general goal of such procedures will be
to ascertain the HIV susceptibility and the prognosis on the
development of AIDS in patients. A person whose genome harbors
some of the variations similar to the Dolly Genome is likely to
possess some of the IV resistance exhibited by Dolly's cells.
2. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing the
Expert Testimony of Richard Myers referenced in Plaintiff's Reply. To obtain
a copy of Richard Myers' Expert Testimony, see The Program for Law and
Technology at California Institute of Technology & Loyola Law School Web
site, at http://techlaw.lls.edu/atc3/pleadings.html.
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Contrary to the categorical declarations of Defendant Dolly's
expert (see Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D. at 5), a number of
well established genome comparison techniques require the entire
(whole) genome as a substrate. One such technique is Restriction
Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) analysis. See WATSON,
supra, at 511-37. Many such polymorphisms are "linked" to
functional genes, thus the presence of a polymorphism is indicative
of the neighboring gene's function. If a patient's sample is analyzed
side-by-side with the Dolly Genome and a similar RFLP pattern is
observed, a similar function is expected. The aforementioned use is
well established as required by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) since only "well-known" techniques can be
used.
C. The Proposed Use of the Claimed Sequences Is Specific,
Substantial, and Credible
The burden is on the challenger of the patent to show that the
use is "incredible" to the practitioner of the art at the time the
application was filed. Such a practitioner must show "rational basis
to doubt the truth." (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 1013.) For the
following reasons, we see no rational basis in such doubt.
D. The Use of Isolated P1-Pl O Sequences Is Specific, Substantial,
and Credible
Defendant Dolly discredits the use in gene therapy on two
grounds. First, Defendant Dolly's expert criticizes the technique of
gene therapy for its limited success. Secondly, Defendant Dolly
doubts whether the P 1-P 10 sequences work as described (confer HIV
resistance on susceptible tissues in vivo and in vitro). Both
arguments lack sufficient ground.
1. Gene therapy is a specific procedure with credible applications
Proof of utility does not require that gene therapy must have
cured anyone before the patent on a therapeutic sequence is granted.
See Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980)
(concluding that adequate proof of any such activity constitutes a
showing of practical utility); see also Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040,
1051 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding sufficient utility based on in vitro test
results in lieu of possible future testing in humans). Courts merely
1058
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require a likelihood of success. The challenger, therefore, must
explain why a particular sequence is unlikely to work. The fact that
the technique itself is uncertain has no bearing on the potential of the
claimed sequences in relation to others. Numerous groups are
working on various gene therapy projects, including Plaintiff s
expert. (See Expert Test. Noriyuki Kasahara, M.D., Ph.D.)3
Therefore, at least some sequences are likely to produce successful
results. The expert's criticism is a personal opinion of a general
nature. It has no bearing on the credibility of the specific use.
2. The specific performance (function) of P1-P10 sequences is
credible
Second, Defendant Dolly doubts that the P1-P10 sequences
works as described in the specifications. He demands the description
of "the nature of those sub-cellular factors involved in increasing
HIV resistance." (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 1014.) This
argument is contrary to established law. According to the PTO
Utility Examination Guidelines, it "is not a requirement of
patentability that an inventor correctly set forth, or even know, how
or why the invention works." Utility Examination Guidelines, 66
Fed. Reg. 1092, 1095 (Jan. 5, 2001) (quoting Newman v. Quigg, 877
F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
It is ironic that Defendant Dolly quotes In re Isaacs, 347 F.2d
887 (C.C.P.A. 1965). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
reversed the rejection based on lack of utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
See id. at 888-90. The Isaacs' invention comprised a now well-
known antiviral compound named "Interferon." Id. at 888. The
exact mechanisms of action of this substance are still unclear after
decades of investigation. See FRANK FENNER & DAVID 0. WHITE,
MEDICAL VIROLOGY 94-97, 130-31 (2d ed. 1976). Nevertheless,
Interferon is widely prescribed as an efficient antiviral agent. See In
re Isaacs, 347 F.2d at 888-90. The PTO in In re Issacs found the in
vitro testing credible and satisfactory. However, the examiners were
deterred by the uncertainty: "What this viral interfering activity
3. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing the
Expert Testimony of Noriyuki Kasahara referenced in Plaintiffs Reply. To
obtain a copy of Noriyuki Kasahara's Expert Testimony, see The Program for
Law and Technology at California Institute of Technology & Loyola Law
School Web site, at http:lltechlaw.lls.edu/atc3/pleadings.html.
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amounts to and the nature and extent of its interference are not
specified in the claims ...." Id. at 892. The appellate court
disagreed and held that "an applicant need not understand the theory
or scientific principle underlying his invention." Id. (citing In re
Storrs, 245 F.2d 474, 478 (C.C.P.A. 1957)). "All that an applicant
need do is enable a person skilled in the art to duplicate his
efforts ...." Id.
The facts of NuGenEra's invention are virtually identical to
those found in In re Isaacs. The record indicates that NuGenEra
performed standard procedures to generate and test transgenic cells
and animals carrying P1-P10 sequences. A valid result was obtained
(reduced HIV infection upon challenge as measured by valid
methods). No scientific fact is presented to suggest the impossibility
of such outcome. No fraud is alleged, much less proven. The
criticism has no requisite "rational basis." If anything, the
incredulous tone of Defendant Dolly's response suggests non-
obviousness of the invention. In conclusion, the results of the
aforementioned tests provide sufficient basis for finding the
therapeutic use of the P1-P10 sequences "specific, credible, and
substantial" under established law.
Likewise, the diagnostic use of P1-P 10 sequences involves well-
established procedures (RFLP analysis with P1-P10 sequences as
probes or a source of PCR primers). No explanation is provided as
to why the procedures may not succeed. To discredit the use in
standard techniques, Defendant Dolly must explain why the isolated
Dolly P1-P10 sequences will not hybridize to the P1-P10 sequences
from other people when used as probes (contrary to the described
chemical properties of DNA). See RICHARD R. SINDEN, DNA
STRUCTURE AND FuNcTIoN 1-57 (1994). The predictive value of the
obtained results in regard to HIV need not amount to absolute
certainty. Some traits like Huntington's disease invariably develop if
a particular sequence is present. Other sequences only increase the
likelihood of a certain outcome. For the test to be useless, the
sequence has to have no bearing whatsoever on the trait in question.
Given the results of in vitro and in vivo tests, one cannot argue that
the P1-P10 sequences have absolutely no relation to the trait of HIV
resistance.
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3. The use of the isolated Dolly Genome is specific, substantial, and
credible
The diagnostic procedure that employs the entire isolated
genome is as standard as those employing the P1-PlO sequences
(RFLP analysis). No evidence is presented as to why the isolated
Dolly Genome will not react with probes when run side-by-side with
another person's DNA. The substantial value of such experiments
depends on the probe used. A variety of probes may be obtained
from countless public and private sources. For example, if a probe
such as P1-PlO sequence is involved in HIV resistance, one's
isolated genome may be probed with it to predict whether the
resistance exists. The result will be meaningless unless the RFLP
pattern of the test sample is compared to that of the Dolly Genome.
The use in RFLP analysis is credible.
In summary, Defendant Dolly offers no evidence of technical
impossibility ("incredulousness") of the standard procedures
encompassed by the disclosed term "diagnostic use." The objection
then is limited to the substantiality of the result. The predictive value
of the analysis is doubted as unsupported by linkage analysis that
requires the analysis of numerous samples. There is no evidence that
such analysis has not been done. Since, when in doubt, the claims
must be read as to preserve their validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282,
Plaintiff interprets "isolated" in Claim 2 to be a standard result of a
linkage analysis and gene-finding procedure performed using the
large number of samples in possession of NuGenEra. See WATSON,
supra, at 511-37 (describing the details of the standard procedure).
Defendant Dolly's expert belittles NuGenEra suggesting that this
task would have been insurmountable. However, NuGenEra had the
resources to sequence the entire genome. It took many years for the
Human Genome Project and Celera to accomplish the same task.
E. The "Combinatorial Issue" Is Moot
Lastly, Defendant Dolly engages in a futile mental exercise
attacking the term "sequence combination." The validity of the gene
combination P1-PlO is being challenged as not having been
sufficiently tested. The further suggestion is to perform "a minimum
of 1.8 billion separate assays," (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at
1016), to rule out other gene combinations (possibly less than ten)
and the role of background DNA. This argument is without merit.
April 2002] 1061
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First, the role of background DNA is ruled out by a "negative
control" that is an integral part of every scientific experiment. There
is no evidence to suggest that NuGenEra's procedures are grossly
inadequate so as not to have control. Likewise, it is preposterous to
suggest the existence of PTO examiners not familiar with the
elementary rules of the scientific method.
Second, the "combinatorial argument" is moot as it is based on a
literal misreading of the language of the specification. Defendant
Dolly alleges that what is claimed is "'one or more' P gene
combination [that] confers HIV resistance." (Def.'s Mem. Supp.
Suum. J. at 1016 (emphasis added).) However, the specification
reads: "One or more genes in combination 'P' [that] confer...."
(Pl.'s Compl., App. B (emphasis added).) Defendant Dolly's
wording suggests a code-like "combination" of which "one or more"
are claimed. However, the use of the verb "confer" in its singular
form necessarily connects it to "genes." "One or more genes confer"
is grammatically correct. "One or more combination confer" is not.
The combination does not do anything and has no independent
meaning. What is claimed is a group (combination) of genes. The
genes confer resistance. It is not unusual for several genes to have
the same effect separately or in combination. Each gene confers
resistance by itself (as verified by the experiments), but it is possible
to have more than one as Dolly has all ten.4
The required presumption of validity limits the interpretation of
claims to those that will not be invalidating. Therefore, the
interpretation that suggests that billions of experiments were not
done is not likely to be adopted.
In conclusion, it is apparent that in the case of the P1-PlO
sequences (Claim 2) the "target disease" demanded by Defendant
Dolly is AIDS. The "real world use" for the P1-PlO sequences and
the entire genome is diagnosis and treatment of AIDS. NuGenEra's
'271 patent is justly awarded and well deserved. It is true that the
genome and the genes therein may have more uses than was
4. The reality of the laboratory practice suggests that the genes were tested
separately. The introduction of genes into cells is significantly less efficient as
the sequences get longer. It is preposterous to think that a researcher would
overcome the tremendous difficulties of introducing ten genes at once prior to
testing them one-by-one (the latter being an ordinary experiment done with
relative ease).
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envisioned by NuGenEra at the time of application. However, the
multitude of future uses neither discredits nor contradicts the
presently available uses. The recent PTO examination guidelines
state: "Other researchers may discover higher, better or more
practical uses, but they are advantaged by the starting point that the
original disclosure provides." Utility Examination Guidelines, 66
Fed. Reg. 1092, 1094 (Jan. 5, 2001).
Finally, it has been argued that insufficient proof of utility is a
counter-productive reason for denying the patent protection. The
purpose of the patent system is to create incentives that stimulate
discovery and disclosure to the public. If the inventors are forced to
hold back the disclosure (in order to gather more and more
convincing evidence of utility), both the inventor and the public lose
and the legislative purpose is frustrated. On the other hand, if the
patent is granted but the utility is not as hoped for, the result is in line
with the legislative intent. The new information is disclosed to the
public. At the same time the patentee does not gain more than he
deserves if the invention is disfavored by the market because of
insufficient utility. See Eric P. Mirabel, "Practical Utility" Is a
Useless Concept, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 811, 823 (1987).
Ill. No INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT DOLLY ARE VIOLATED
BY THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PATENT
A. No Issues of Privacy or Fiduciary Duty Are Raised by Defendant
Dolly's Original Consent Form
Defendant Dolly has attempted to show at length how the
existence of the consent form signed by Dolly leads to legal and
ethical concerns for NuGenEra. Upon closer examination it becomes
clear that NuGenEra obtained the sample in a legally valid and
morally acceptable way. It should be recognized that NuGenEra was
not one of the original parties involved in obtaining the consent. The
form represents an agreement solely between AGTC and Dolly.
When NuGenEra purchased the sample from AGTC, a copy of the
consent form was supplied to NuGenEra for reasons that have not
been made clear.
Furthermore, AGTC fulfilled all fiduciary duties to Dolly
because AGTC had no economic or personal interests in his genetic
material. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120,
A-pIril 2002] 1063
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129, 793 P.2d 479, 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150 (1990) (explaining
that a physician must disclose personal interests in research and that
failure to do so raises a cause of action based on informed consent
and breach of fiduciary duty). Whereas AGTC fulfilled its duty
towards Dolly, NuGenEra never had any such duty. Defendant
Dolly would make it seem that some action of NuGenEra violates the
genetic privacy of Dolly. This is simply not true. NuGenEra has not
disclosed any information tying the identity of Dolly to his genomic
sequence.
B. There Exists No Inherent Right to Profit from Productive Use of
One's Tissue Samples
NuGenEra's patent does not limit any rights of profit that belong
to Dolly. This is because such a right never existed in regard to
blood or human parts. Neither courts nor statutes recognize a right to
profit from human parts. Further, any added value of Dolly's blood,
above the value of the blood of a normal human being, is a result of
NuGenEra's research and the property of NuGenEra.
1. Courts do not recognize a constitutional right to profit from
research conducted on excised tissue
Defendant Dolly seeks to assert common law and constitutional
property rights to use and sell his genetic material by claiming
property rights to be inherent in one's removed blood. In doing so,
he relies on the authority of a decision in which the factual premise
and legal issues considered are greatly distinguishable. The court in
Green v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1229 (1980) simply held that for
tax-related purposes, blood sold could be classified as a product, not
a service, and that the deterioration over time of certain factors
within the blood could not be translated into depreciation value. See
id. at 1238. The tax court compared a person's blood to "hen's eggs,
bee's honey, cow's milk, or sheep's wool." Id. at 1234. This
analogy led the court to consider the donation of blood to be the sale
of a product. See id. However, the court never stated that blood is
property.
What is important to note is that in reaching this conclusion, the
court did not discuss what kind of products may actually constitute
property. Further, blood is not universally regarded as a product. A
New York court ruled in Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 123
1064
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N.E.2d 792, 794-96 (N.Y. 1954), that the transfer of blood is a
service, and not a product. A California Court of Appeal affirmed
that decision in Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hospital, Inc., 33 Cal. App.
3d 606, 610-12, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132, 134-35 (1973).
The difference between human blood and the milk of a cow or
the eggs of a hen is impossible to ignore. Humans need blood,
whereas a cow does not need its milk. One cannot regulate how
often a hen lays an egg, but there are restrictions on how often a
person can donate blood. Cutting a sheep's wool will not adversely
affect the sheep's ability to grow wool. However, taking blood can
adversely affect humans. Repeatedly losing blood eventually causes
a person to lose the ability to generate plasma. See Green, 74 T.C. at
1232. Clearly, blood cannot be treated in the same manner as a hen's
egg.
Along the same lines, Defendant Dolly's reliance on a
conclusion in Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 850, 20
Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (1993), classifying isolated sperm as property
due to its potential to create a child after fertilization, is broadly
overstated because the court made this recognition only as factually
applied to the case. The court found the decedent sperm donor had
an interest "in the nature of ownership, to the extent that he had
decision making authority as to the [use of his] sperm [for
reproduction]," id. at 846, 20 Cal Rptr. 2d at 281, and found that the
sperm qualified as property under section 62 of the California
Probate Code in order to grant the Probate Court jurisdiction over the
vials. See id. It is worthwhile to note that the court did not reach a
conclusion as to property rights in the human body, and specifically
declined to extend to the sperm general laws relating to personal
property. This case is thus distinguishable on the ground that
accordance of property rights was granted only to determine the
disposition of gametic material and respective reproductive rights of
a decedent-donor and his widow.
Due to the factual distinction and pertinent questions that these
prior decisions did not reach, authority on this subject of property
rights lies in Moore. Because Defendant Dolly likewise did not
arrange to retain possession of his blood sample, he retained no
constitutional protection to profit from any productive use of those
samples, as he claims. Therefore, reliance on the narrow holdings of
Green, Hecht, and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) to
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demonstrate a continuing right to profit from donated or sold blood is
erroneous.
2. Legislative statutes do not recognize a constitutional right to
profit from research conducted on excised tissue
Defendant Dolly argues the genome "is inviolably one's own
property, as much as a heart, or brain, or blood is one's own
property." (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 1020.) Further,
Defendant Dolly argues that the classification of blood and DNA as
"property" gives a person the right to profit from them. (See Def.'s
Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 1023-26.) If that were true, then Dolly
would have the right to sell his brain. However, the State of
California does prevent people from profiting from the sale of their
body parts. Under section 367f(a) of the California Penal Code, "it
shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, sell,
promote the transfer of, or otherwise transfer any human organ, for
purposes of transplantation, for valuable consideration." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 367f(a) (West 1999). This law strongly suggests
California's aversion to the sale of human products. Even
nonessential organs, such as a person's kidney, are not exempt from
this prohibition. This indicates there is no implicit right to sell one's
blood for profit. Without such a right, Dolly lost no potential for
profiting from his blood or his genes when the Office of Trademarks
and Patents granted NuGenEra's patent.
Defendant Dolly also claims that the UAGA implicitly
categorizes body parts as property solely because donations refer to
the giving of "something," a single term, which Defendant Dolly,
without inquiry into legislative intent, concludes must equate to
property and its bundle of implied rights. The inapplicability of this
statute as an authority to Defendant Dolly's right to profit claim is
addressed in Moore, which states that the Act "does not, however,
permit the donor to receive 'valuable consideration' for the transfer."
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 137 n.22, 793
P.2d 479, 489 n.22, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 156 n.22 (1990) (quoting
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7155 (West 1970 & Supp. 2001)).
Defendant Dolly's attempt to characterize his blood samples as
donations for which he may claim a constitutional right to profit thus
fails.
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C. Defendant Dolly Does Not Have an Inherent Right to Profitfrom
His Genome
As there is no natural right to profit from the sale of one's blood,
there exists no right to profit from one's genome. Defendant Dolly's
argument that his genome sequence belongs to him and that he has a
right to sell it does not hold. He has no more right to sell his DNA
than he does his brain. Therefore, NuGenEra's patent does not
infringe on Dolly's right to profit.
D. Profitability of the Dolly Genome Currently Belongs to
NuGenEra
If the Court finds that Dolly can sell his genome, what would be
its value? AGTC sold Dolly's blood sample to NuGenEra for a
minimal price. Then, the value of his blood was the same as
anybody else's. Had Dolly gone directly to NuGenEra to sell his
blood at that time, it could be inferred that NuGenEra would not
have paid Dolly any more money than they paid AGTC. Dolly
would not have expected a higher price, as he would not have known
any reason for a higher price.
After NuGenEra discovered Dolly's HIV immunity and filed its
patent, the monetary value of Dolly's blood rose. Dolly did nothing
to increase the value of his genome. The value of Dolly's blood rose
because of the knowledge that it contained HIV resistant genes.
NuGenEra discovered this information, and it is the intellectual
property of NuGenEra. Dolly's profit from selling his genome is
profit he stole from NuGenEra, not the profit from his genome alone.
Dolly's genome was no more marketable than a normal human
genome before NuGenEra's discovery. Therefore, the patent does
not impose new limitations on Dolly's ability to profit, nor should it
increase Dolly's ability to profit.
E. NuGenEra's Patent Does Not Limit Defendant Dolly's General
Right to Profit
NuGenEra does not object to Dolly donating blood. Nor does
NuGenEra object to Dolly participating in research. These were
rights he had before NuGenEra ever made its discovery and
invention. What Plaintiff does object to is Dolly attempting to profit
from research NuGenEra performed. The patent does not limit
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Dolly's natural rights; it merely prevents him from trampling over
NuGenEra's.
F. Patents Are Exclusionary Rights and Cannot Be Considered an
Invasion of Defendant Dolly's Right to Bodily Autonomy
Defendant Dolly argues that NuGenEra's patent should be
invalidated for fundamental reasons of public policy, so far as it
prevents Defendant Dolly from being able to use his genetic
material. He claims that the existence of the NuGenEra patent
reflects the severe consequences of a legislative failure and argues
that the patent threatens each citizen's "life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness," (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 1018), equating the
enforcement of the patent to an invasion of his bodily autonomy.
Such dramatic language might strongly suggest that Dolly has been
harshly mistreated or that he at the very least, faces a serious threat to
his liberty or quality of life. Upon closer examination, however, it is
apparent that no such mistreatment has occurred and no such threat
exists. Bodily autonomy implicates a freedom from physical harm
and does not apply to excised tissue that a patient has willingly
donated. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 147, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal.
Rptr. at 161. The right to bodily autonomy, as tort law understands
it, addresses physical invasions or restraints of an individual's
corporeal body or person. The patent's authority is an exclusionary
right, and one that invades no actual bodily boundaries. It certainly
does not violate, as Defendant Dolly insists, the "right to use, and
control the use of, their own person." (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J.
at 1020.)
Moreover, the right to bodily autonomy is a protected liberty,
but no right is absolute if there exist laws that restrict them.
Incarceration, which curtails bodily autonomy, is an available
punishment for criminals who violate the law. In the same way,
under U.S. patent law, others are prohibited for twenty years from
the manufacture, use, sale or offer of sale of patented inventions.
Defendant Dolly's exclusion from selling his tissues cannot,
therefore, be considered an affront to his absolute rights.
NuGenEra's patent is purely a matter of intellectual property.
Just as NuGenEra's possession of this intellectual property places no
claim upon the physical body of Dolly, it is likewise reasonable that
Dolly's physical body gives no inherent claim upon the patent.
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These distinct entities need not interfere with each other.
Notwithstanding the patent, Dolly keeps his right to donate blood,
sell blood plasma, or even offer his tissue to those interested in
general academic research. In short, he maintains the same personal
rights he had before he learned about the NuGenEra patent. He is
limited only in that he cannot supply his blood for the sole purpose
of infringing the NuGenEra patent. But this is profit that Dolly
would never have been able to gain before the research and
subsequent patent by NuGenEra. It would seem then that Dolly is
not interested in maintaining his rights, so much as he would like to
expand them in a particularly profitable way.
1. Grant of the patent is not an invasion of Defendant Dolly's
genetic privacy
Defendant Dolly alleges that NuGenEra's patent violates his
genetic privacy. This argument holds very little merit given the
circumstances that led to the present suit. Although NuGenEra
received enough information to notify Defendant Dolly of his natural
resistance to HIV once they discovered this trait, Plaintiff never
attributed the patented sequence to any particular source. In fact,
Defendant Dolly's role as the original tissue source was unknown to
the public until he infringed the patent. He argues that in patenting
his nucleotide sequence under Claim 1, NuGenEra violated the
policy of the proposed Genetic Privacy Act, which guards against
genetic discrimination based on dissemination of "'information about
an identifiable individual."' (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 1022
(quoting Patricia (Winnie) Roche et al., The Genetic Privacy Act: A
Proposal for National Legislation, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 7 (1996)).)
However, this argument seems tangential considering that NuGenEra
never allowed any genetic information to be identifiable to Dolly.
As we recall, Dolly has been responsible for this himself. NuGenEra
never thwarted the Genetic Privacy Act's policy goals through its
work on the tissue sample. Defendant Dolly claims that the
information held within the Dolly Genome contains "power to
greatly harm the very individual from which it is derived." (Def's
Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 1020.) Danger exists only to the extent that
the genetic information can be tied to an individual owner. It is
ironic that Dolly is personally responsible for any public knowledge
that ties him to the genome in the NuGenEra patent: For this reason,
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Dolly was the only individual NuGenEra informed about the source
of the genetic sequences involved in the patent and this as a courtesy.
2. Defendant Dolly's constitutional rights to procreate or die are not
affected
Defendant Dolly contends that the enforcement of NuGenEra's
patent further violates two other privacy rights: the right to die
(personal privacy) and the right to make decisions regarding whether
or not to bear children (relational privacy). The Supreme Court has
indeed found these rights to be fundamental, but these liberty rights
are as inapplicable to Defendant Dolly's reproductive rights as they
were to his alleged right to profit from his tissue. The factual
settings and legal issues upon which those constitutional law
decisions were predicated bear little resemblance to Defendant
Dolly's situation. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269, 284-87 (1990), the Court upheld the right
of a terminally ill patient to refuse medical treatment, so long as the
decision is made of sound mind. NuGenEra's patent does not
preclude Defendant Dolly from his right to die or ability to execute
his wish that medical treatment be withheld should he ever find
himself in this situation. He is also not prevented from deciding not
to procreate, which was ruled a fundamental right in Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 74-
75 (2000), the Court held that parents have the right to control the
upbringing of their children, but this decision also does not pertain to
Defendant Dolly's complaints. These decisions affirmed the
fundamental rights to life and control of family decision making, as
society has traditionally understood them. Defendant Dolly's
contention, however, that these rights should extend to protect his
infiingement of NuGenEra's patent misapplies the Court's
understanding of the fundamental right of liberty.
NuGenEra's patent does not prevent Defendant Dolly from
making fundamental life decisions regarding his own body. His
assertion that NuGenEra's immortalized cell line (described in Claim
3) of the patent could cause him to be "kept alive" is scientifically
unfounded in principle and practice. The patented cell line is
physically distinguishable from Defendant Dolly's original tissue
source due to its purified state.
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Defendant Dolly's speculation that he could be reproduced
against his will through the technology of cloning is not a viable
argument to invalidate an otherwise valid gene patent. There are
statutory safeguards, including the one in effect in California, which
have placed a moratorium on human cloning until its ramifications
can be fully ascertained. Defendant Dolly's allegations of perceived
constitutional injury and unsubstantiated fears regarding the
enforcement of Plaintiff's patent thus do not amount to legitimate
public policy concerns. For this reason, Defendant Dolly's
affirmative defenses fall to meet the clear and convincing standard of
evidence needed to invalidate the '271 patent.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in Plaintiffs Points and
Authorities, NuGenEra's patent is valid, the patent's enforcement
does not violate any of Defendant Dolly's rights, and the social
benefits of this type of patent greatly outweigh risks of potential
harm. Even if the Court should find Plaintiffs arguments
unconvincing, sufficient evidence has been presented to allow
Plaintiff to continue with discovery in order to identify the remaining
(but currently unknown) Defendants and make more specific
statements regarding policy concerns and actual infringement of this
patent.
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